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We analyse to what extent the accrual anomaly is related to the choice of the accounting 
system as well as firm-level heterogeneity in corporate governance mechanisms. Using a 
unique dataset of listed German firms over the period 1995 to 2005 we first corroborate 
former results indicating that the accrual anomaly is also present in Germany. However, this 
anomaly seems to be driven mainly by firms with managerial ownership. In a second step, we 
test how different corporate governance mechanisms affect the anomaly. For the German 
experiment on voluntary adoption of IFRS our results confirm previous findings that the 
anomaly is less likely to be present under a conservative accounting system. While creditor 
monitoring is able to reduce the accrual anomaly, shareholder monitoring is not. Apart from 
offering evidence related to the cross-sectional difference in the degree of accrual mispricing, 
our results give also some insights related to the cross-country variation of this phenomenon. 
 
 
JEL Classification: G32, G34, M4, M41 
 
Keywords: Accrual Anomaly, Earnings Quality, Corporate Governance, Managerial 
Ownership, Capital Market Efficiency, Accounting Standard, Shareholder Monitoring, 
Creditor Monitoring 
   2
1. Introduction 
 
In the accounting literature, earnings management and accrual mispricing are two well 
documented phenomena (cf. Dechow and Schrand (2004)). Among others, the following 
stylized facts emerge from this literature. First, the accrual anomaly is related to earnings 
management discretion (cf. Xie (2001) and Chen and Cheng (2002)). Second, earnings 
management is driven by the corporate governance environment a firm faces. In fact, Leuz et 
al. (2003) show that earnings management decreases in investor protection. As a consequence, 
one would expect from these results the accrual anomaly to be more pronounced in code law 
countries as compared to civil law countries, given that the latter have a higher degree of 
investor protection. However, empirical results point in the opposite direction. Though Pincus 
et al. (2007) and LaFond (2005) find the accrual anomaly to be a global phenomenon, their 
results indicate that it is less severe in code law countries rather than in civil law countries. 
 
This paper aims to shed more light on these conflicting results by scrutinzing the 
drivers for the accrual anomaly in a code law country setting in more detail. By and large, the 
stylized characteristics of a code law system compared to a civil law system are the following: 
(i) stronger insider involvement (cf. Leuz et al. (2003)); (ii) more bank oriented financing 
(Gorton and Schmid (2000)); (iii) less developed markets for corporate control (cf. Wenger 
and Kaserer (1998), Köke (2004)); (iv) rather conservative accounting systems (until recently, 
at least) (cf. Daske et al. (2008)); and (v) less pronounced accounting rules enforcement (cf. 
Hope (2003)). 
 
Starting from these observations and considering that informativeness of financial 
statements is the result of a complex interaction of various institutional factors (fixed at the 
jurisdictional level) and firm specific corporate governance mechanisms, it is by far not clear 
in which of the two systems the accrual mispricing should be more widespread. In fact, while 
less developed external corporate governance might led to the expectation that accrual 
mispricing is more severe, ubiquitous insider ownership and stronger creditor monitoring may 
have the opposite effect. It should be noted, however, that the direction of the impact of 
insider ownership on the informativeness of earnings is unclear, as the literature points in 
different directions (cf. Warfield et al. (1995), Gabrielsen et al. (2002)). Moreover, according 
to Kaserer and Klingler (2008) the accounting system is a driving factor for the accrual 
anomaly.   3
Hence, for a better understanding of the accrual anomaly it is important to gather a 
deeper knowledge about the impact of these different factors. In this paper we focus on the 
analysis of firm-specific corporate governance mechanisms holding the set of institutional 
factors constant. More specifically, we start from results offered by Kaserer and Klingler 
(2008), who have shown that German firms switching deliberately from a conservative 
accounting system to a true-and-fair-view system reinforce the accrual anomaly (i.e. decrease 
the informativeness of their financial statements). They argue, that in an institutional setting 
like Germany, where the enforcement of accounting regulation is comparatively weak (cf. 
Hope (2003)), the introduction of a true-and-fair-view accounting system with difficult-to-




Of course, following the earnings management literature this dilution of the 
informativeness of earnings is related to the firm specific corporate governance mechanisms 
in place. However, Kaserer and Klingler (2008) did not account for that effect. It is therefore 
the major contribution of this paper to extend their approach by integrating corporate 
governance mechanisms in the analysis. Specifically, we scrutinize to what extent the accrual 
anomaly is driven by firm-level heterogeneity in managerial ownership and corporate 
governance characteristics including the choice of the accounting system. Using a single-
country-study for Germany allows us to hold the institutional setting constant in order to 
isolate firm-level differences in terms of managerial ownership and corporate governance 
mechanisms. Apart from offering some explanations for the cross-sectional difference in the 
degree of accrual mispricing, our results give also some insights related to the cross-country 
variation of this phenomenon. 
 
In this paper we analyse 575 German firms over the period 1995 to 2005 (3,109 firm-year 
observations). Our results extend existing literature in several ways. Previous studies have 
shown that the existence of the accrual anomaly depends on the applied accounting standard 
(Kaserer and Klingler (2008)) and institutional differences across countries (LaFond (2005), 
Pincus et al. (2007)). To our knowledge, this is the first study which shows how the existence 
of the accrual anomaly is related to differences in ownership structure and corporate 
governance issues within one country. First, we find that the level of managerial ownership 
                                                 
1 Cf. Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) and Zimmermann and Gontcharov (2003). According to their studies 
German firms reporting under IFRS/IAS are more engaged in earnings management and income smoothing than 
those firms applying German GAAP.   4
has a significant impact on the existence of the accrual anomaly in the German capital market. 
Based on the suggested link between the quality and informativeness of reported earnings and 
the accrual mispricing this finding suggests that managerial power, measured by managerial 
ownership, has an important impact on the extent of earnings management. Based on that 
finding, we continue to analyse the sub-sample of managerial ownership firms. In particular, 
we focus on the impact of other firm-level corporate governance mechanisms, such as the 
accounting standard, shareholder and creditor monitoring. 
 
Second, our findings corroborate existing evidence that accounting rules matter for the 
existence of the accrual anomaly (Kaserer and Klingler (2008)). We find that the accrual 
anomaly is less prevalent for firms complying with German GAAP. In fact, if enforcement of 
accounting rules is weak, a conservative accounting approach, such as German GAAP, might 
be better suitable to reduce information asymmetries between corporate insiders and investors 
than a true-and-fair-view accounting system, such as IFRS or US-GAAP.  
 
Third, our findings indicate that creditor monitoring has an influence on the accrual 
anomaly while shareholder monitoring has not. We interpret this finding in a way that 
sophisticated lenders (especially banks) are better capable to monitor management than 
shareholders, probably because of a less developed market for corporate control in Germany. 
 
Fourth, our hedge portfolio test indicates that the relationship of managerial ownership 
and the accrual anomaly in Germany is also of high economic significance. An active 
portfolio strategy that goes long in a group of firms with low accruals and short in a group of 
firms with high accruals would result in significant positive abnormal stock market returns for 
the managerial ownership firms but not for firms without managerial investment. Of course, 
market imperfections such as transaction costs, can limit the implementation of such a 
strategy in the real world. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the theoretical 
background underlying our study and develops hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research 
design. In section 4 the empirical results are presented while section 5 concludes.   5
 
2 Theory and Hypotheses 
 
2.1 The impact of earnings management and earnings quality on the accrual anomaly  
 
The study by Xie (2001) is the first one analyzing the impact of earnings management on 
the accrual anomaly. By introducing a more sophisticated measure of earnings management 
based on the definition of abnormal accruals according to Jones (1991), she shows that the 
accrual anomaly is, in fact, driven by abnormal accruals. Hence, she concludes that the 
misprcing is due to managerial discretion in manipulating reported earnings. This result is 
further corroborated in a study presented by Chen and Cheng (2002). They argue that 
abnormal accruals can be used by the management either to signal private information about 
future performance or for opportunistic earnings management. By identifying a sub-sample of 
firms where the management is more likely to engage in earnings management, they can show 
that future abnormal returns are negatively associated with abnormal accruals, whereas the 
association is positive for those firms that are presumed to use abnormal accruals as a mean 
for signalling future performance. These results suggest that investors seem not to be able to 
detect the management’s motivation for using abnormal accruals.
2 
 
2.2 Managerial Ownership and Accrual Anomaly 
 
According to the “law and finance” literature the institutional setting of a country (such as 
legal origin, level of investor protection, legal enforcement, level of financial market 
development, corporate ownership patterns, etc.) is a major determinant for corporate policy 
decisions (cf. LaPorta et al. (1998, 1999, 2000)). Leuz et al. (2003) build on that literature and 
analyse earnings management as one distinct corporate policy choice around the world. Based 
on an analysis of 31 countries they find large international differences across several earnings 
management measures, such as loss avoidance or earnings smoothing. Hence, they conclude 
that corporate governance is a major determinant of earnings management. In particular they 
argue about “insiders’ incentives to manage earnings as a way to conceal their private control 
benefits” (cf. Leuz et al. (2003), p. 508). If differences in corporate governance across 
                                                 
2 Gunny et al. (2007) and Jacob and Jorgensen (2007) show that earnings measured over alternative annual 
periods appear less likely to suffer from the effects of managerial income manipulation than earnings measured 
over the fiscal year. This is documented by a significant higher hedge return based on fiscal year accruals than 
based on accruals for the alternative annual periods.   6
countries matters for earnings management, we expect also differences in corporate 
governance within one country to be relevant for earnings management. In fact, the rationale 
behind this study is to analyse the relevance of firm-level differences in corporate ownership 
and corporate governance for the accrual anomaly. Thereby, we hold the institutional 
corporate governance setting constant by focusing on a single-country study.  
 
From a theoretical point of view managerial ownership seems to have conflicting 
effects on quality of reported earnings: On the one hand, there are good arguments for a 
positive relationship between managerial ownership and earnings quality. Firms with high 
managerial investments are less dependent on capital market pressure. Hence, accounting 
choices of firms with high managerial ownership seem to reflect the true economic situation 
rather than personal motives. Or expressed differently: Managers in firms underlying a 
stronger capital market pressure might c.p. more likely make income-increasing or income-
smoothing accounting decisions (Stein (1989), Klassen (1997)). Moreover, based on agency 
theory the convergence-of-interests hypothesis would suggest that managerial ownership leads 
to a better information content of reported earnings. On the other hand, there are also good 
arguments for a negative relationship between managerial ownership and earnings quality. 
First, the managerial entrenchment hypothesis suggests that this negative relationship is due 
to the fact that managers use earnings management in order to conceal their private control 
benefits.
3 Second, there is the possibility that managerial ownership is endogenous in a way 
that managers purposely invest in firms with low earnings quality. Finally, following the idea 
that earnings quality does not only depend on managerial discretion (supply of earnings 
quality) but also on investors’ expectations (demand for earnings quality), one could argue 
that investors require a better quality of reported earnings if ownership is diffuse and 
information asymmetry higher. As empirical evidence for a non-US-setting suggests a 
negative relationship between managerial ownership and earnings quality (Gabrielsen et al. 
(2002)), we expect that managerial ownership might be relevant for the existence of the 
accrual anomaly. In particular, we expect the accrual anomaly to be present mainly in firms 
with managerial ownership. Consequently, we test the following null-hypothesis: 
 
                                                 
3 A particular aspect of such private benefits in the context of this study might be the fact that insider ownership 
in Germany is closely related to family ownership. The income of these family members often, however, 
depends to a large extent on the firm’s dividend payment. This gives an additional incentive to insiders to 
smooth earnings.   7
H0(i):  Accrual anomaly hypothesis in relation with managerial ownership: Firms with 
managerial ownership and firms without managerial ownership do not significantly differ 
with respect to the pricing of earnings components, i.e. accruals and cash-flows. 
   
2.3 Accounting System and Accrual Anomaly 
 
Kaserer and Klingler (2008) already argue that the mispricing of accruals can be explained 
along two dimensions: corporate governance and accounting standard. Conclusive with this 
argument they find that the application of a true-and-fair-view accounting system, such as 
IFRS or US-GAAP, is an important determinant for the existence of the accrual anomaly in 
Germany. It should be noted in this context that conservative accounting relies on easy-to-
verify information, while true-and-fair-view accounting has the goal to incorporate a 
substantial amount of difficult-to-verify information, like fair value information of non traded 
assets.
4 Evidently, the latter approach leaves more discretion to management than the former 
one. Hence, earnings management and income smoothing activities will be easier to 
implement under a true-and-fair-view accounting system than under a conservative 
accounting system. Empirical evidence for Germany in line with this argument was presented 
by Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) and Zimmermann and Gontcharov (2003). In this 
study, we use the capital market experiment on voluntary adoption of international accounting 
standards in Germany to test the following null hypothesis:  
 
H0(ii): Accrual anomaly hypothesis in relation with managerial ownership and a conservative 
accounting standard: The accounting standard has no influence on the existence of the   
accrual anomaly. 
 
2.4 Creditor Monitoring and Accrual Anomaly 
 
Evidently, the extent to which management uses accounting discretion is related to all 
corporate governance mechanisms in place. Hence, beyond insider ownership other 
mechanisms, like creditor monitoring, are presumed to be important. The monitoring effect of 
debt uses two different channels. First, according to the free cash-flow hypothesis (cf. Jensen 
(1986)) debt payments simply reduce managerial discretion over corporate funds. Second, to 
                                                 
4 However, recent amendments to the German GAAP aim to introduce some fair value elements leading to a 
dilution of some conservative accounting elements.   8
the extent that debt is granted by sophisticated institutions, like banks, monitoring capabilities 
as well as incentives have to be taken into account. As banks play still an important role in 
providing funds to German firms, we expect creditor monitoring to significantly improve 
earnings quality and therefore to reduce the mispricing of earnings components. Concretely, 
we test the following null-hypothesis: 
 
H0(iii):  Accrual anomaly hypothesis in relation with managerial ownership and creditor   
monitoring: Creditor monitoring has no influence on the existence of the accrual anomaly. 
 
2.5 Shareholder Monitoring and Accrual Anomaly 
 
Finally, shareholders are another group of capital providers that have a natural interest to 
observe the true economic situation of the firm. Hence, shareholder monitoring is another 
corporate governance device to limit managerial discretion and earnings management 
activities. Grossman and Hart (1980) show that there is no incentive for shareholders to 
engage in monitoring activities in a widely-held corporation. However, large shareholders 
have both the means and the incentives to overcome this free-rider problem associated with 
atomistic shareholder structures (Shleifer and Vishny (1986)). Thus, we expect monitoring by 
large shareholders to have an influence on earnings quality and the accrual anomaly. 
Precisely, we test the following null-hypothesis: 
 
H0(iv):  Accrual anomaly hypothesis in relation with managerial ownership and 





Our sample is constructed as follows: We start off by identifying all German 
corporations whose common stock is listed in the broadest German stock index, the 
Composite German stock index (CDAX) in the period 1995 to 2005.
5 The choice of the 
                                                 
5 In principal, German companies can issue common and preference shares. The issuance of dual class shares has 
been common in Germany for a long time-period. While holders of common shares have a voting right in the 
shareholders assembly, holders of preference shares do usually not. Usually every firm issues at least common 
shares and potentially additional preference shares. However, there are very few exceptions in our sample which 
are only listed with preference shares. Since their ownership structure with dispersed ownership of preference   9
sampling period results from data availability constraints: The disclosure of voting rights (not 
cash-flow rights) became mandatory in Germany according to the German Securities Trading 
Act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, WpHG) in 1995. Since then, reporting of corporate ownership 
to both the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) and the traded company is 
mandatory for shareholders starting with ownership threshold of 5%.
6 Hence, the starting 
point for our sampling period is 1995 since the quality of ownership data in Germany is not 
reliable beforehand. Our sample period ends in 2005 which was the last year with available 
ownership, accounting and capital market information when constructing the dataset. Based 
on this sampling period we identify 891 firms whose stock has ever been listed in the CDAX 
between 1995 and 2005. We exclude banks, insurance companies and other financial services 
providers due to industry-specifics in the financial accounting and the accrual process.
7 
Taking missing values and the elimination of outliers
8 into account, our final sample consists 
of 3,109 firm years.
9 The core data for our analysis comes from Hoppenstedt Aktienführer 
which publishes annual data on ownership structures, management and supervisory board 
compositions of publicly listed German firms. In order to verify ownership information we 
use several further databases: Bureau van Dijk’s Amadeus database, Commerzbank’s Wer 
gehört zu wem, the director dealings database of the Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht and web research. Accounting data used in the study is from 
Worldscope database, whereas capital market data are from Thomson Financial Datastream 
database. 
 
Our empirical design is based on two dependent variables: earnings and abnormal 
stock market returns. To analyse to which extent earnings persistence is attributable to the 
relative magnitude of the cash-flow and accrual component of earnings, we define earnings 
EARt as the year-end’s income before extraordinary items deflated by the average of total 
assets. The cash-flow component CFt is measured as the year-end’s net cash-flow from 
                                                                                                                                                         
shares and heavily concentrated ownership of voting rights is untypical for German CDAX firms, we have 
decided to exclude them from our analysis.  
6 In January 2007 the European Union’s Transparency Directive 2004/109/EG was implemented with the 
Transparenzrichtlinien-Umsetzungsgesetz (TUG), which has further reduced the mandatory reporting limit to 3% 
of voting rights according to §21 WpHG. Currently, the thresholds for shareholders’ mandatory reporting 
according to the WpHG are 3%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 30%, 50% and 75% of voting rights. In case of 
bypassing any of these thresholds shareholders have to report their voting rights to both the listed company and 
the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin).   
7 Cf. e.g. Sloan (1996); the identification of firms from financial services industries is based on the ICB industry 
classification in Thomson Financial Datastream. 
8 For all relevant variables in our empirical analysis we detect and eliminate extreme values based on the 0.5% 
tails on both ends of the distribution. Hence, 99% of all observations remain within our sample.  
9 Note that the sample consists of 575 firms and is thus more comprehensive than earlier studies about the 
German stock market.   10
operating activities which is also deflated by average total assets. The accrual component 
results from the difference between earnings and cash-flow.
10 To test whether stock markets 
are able to fully reflect the information contained in the actual cash-flow and accrual 
component of earnings we use the yearly abnormal stock market return of firm i (AREi,t+1) as 
dependent variable. In detail, we calculate AREi,t+1 as the buy-and-hold return for each 




In our regression models we control for several factors: We use the market value MVt 
defined as the log of market capitalization, the book-to-market ratio BTMt calculated as the 
book value of equity divided by the market value of equity and the earnings-to-price ratio 
ETPt calculated as the earnings per share divided by the stock price. All control variables are 
measured four months after fiscal year end and are included to control for the well 
documented size-, market-to-book and earnings-to-price effects.
12 Furthermore, we use yearly 
beta factors (BETA) which are based on 52-weeks-estimation-windows closing at fiscal year 
end to incorporate a measure of systematic risk. We include industry and year dummies in our 
analysis to control for industry- and time-specific effects. 
 
As we intend to test the influence of managerial ownership on earnings quality and the 
accrual anomaly the sample is split in two sub-samples – one including observations where 
the management is not invested in the firm while the second includes all firm-year 
observations with managerial ownership.
13 In a second step, we build further sub-samples for 
the managerial ownership group based on (a) the applied accounting standard, (b) leverage 
and (c) the existence of further blockholders. Concerning the accounting standard we 
distinguish between firms using a true-and-fair-view accounting standard (international 
accounting standards IFRS and US-GAAP) and firms using a more conservative accounting 
                                                 
10 To calculate the accrual component we follow the cash-flow approach proposed by Collins and Hribar (2000) 
to ensure our results are comparable to previous studies about the accrual anomaly (cf. LaFond  (2005), Pincus et 
al. (2007), Kaserer and Klingler (2008)).  
11 For auditing reasons it usually takes about four month after the fiscal year end to publish an annual report. 
Hence, to measure capital market reactions after the disclosure of accounting information it is essential to take 
this time gap into account. Consequently, we use stock-market returns four month after the fiscal year end (not 
calendar year end) for our calculation of abnormal stock market returns. Being the broadest stock index in 
Germany the CDAX can be considered as the best approximation for a market return in Germany. 
12 For a deeper understanding of the effects cf. Banz (1981), Basu (1983) and Rosenberg et al. (1985).  
13 We have used the median value of managerial ownership to divide the sample into two groups. Since the 
median value of managerial ownership is zero, we receive one sub-sample with managerial ownership and one 
sub-sample without managerial ownership. However, if the management board is invested, this ownership stake 
is usually substantial as the mean (median) value of 36.3% (35.6%) for this sub-sample indicates.   11
standard (German GAAP). We use total debt divided by total assets as our measure for 
leverage. Based on the argument of Jensen (1986) we transfer this continuous variable into a 
dummy variable for firms with high leverage (good corporate governance) and firms with low 
leverage (bad corporate governance). Thereby, we use the median value for the leverage to 
divide the managerial ownership sample into the two sub-groups. Finally, we test for the 
effect of shareholder monitoring by separating firms with a large blockholder (good corporate 
governance) from firms without a large blockholder (bad corporate governance). We consider 





4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
  Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for selective financial and corporate variables. To 
get a first picture of how the variables differ across the total sample, the sub-group with 
managerial ownership and the sub-sample where management is not invested, table 1 shows 
the mean and median values as well as the standard errors for the variables of interest.  
 
- Insert table 1 about here - 
 
  As expected the mean of accruals is negative. This is consistent with related empirical 
studies
15 and due to the large impact of depreciation costs on the accruals.
16 The average 
return on assets (defined as earnings before extraordinary items deflated by average total 
assets, and denoted EAR) is slightly negative for the full sample. This is an unexpected 
finding. However, one possible explanation is provided by the highly negative values for 
realised return on assets in the years 2001 to 2003. This period of low profitability might be a 
result of the burst of the new market bubble.
17 This assumption is supported as the negative 
returns during this period are most notably present in the sub-sample with managerial 
                                                 
14 The 5% threshold is motivated twofold: First, a 5%-ownership stake guarantees the right of shareholders to 
call a shareholders’ meeting according to § 122 I of the German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz). Second, 
5% was the mandatory disclosure threshold during the sample period. 
15 E.g. Kaserer and Klingler (2008). 
16 E.g. Xie (2001); consistent with the study by Xie we find depreciation costs (deflated by average total assets) 
for the total sample of about 0.064.  
17 The average return on assets for the years 2001 to 2003 is about -0.05. Note that in all other years the average 
return on assets is positive.   12
ownership which contains a much higher rate of firms in high tech industries.
18 The mean 
abnormal returns for the full sample as well as for the sub-samples are quite close to zero. As 
the weighted means are even closer to zero the samples should not suffer of any selection 
bias. It should be noted that firms in the sub-sample with managerial ownership are on 
average smaller, have a higher beta and a lower earnings-to-price ratio. They also show a 
higher rate of annual accounts released under international accounting standards (68% in the 
sub-sample with managerial ownership versus 32% in the sub-sample without managerial 
ownership). As expected, the probability for the existence of an external block holder is lower 
for the firms where the management is invested in the firm. The mean leverage with about 
0.20 is almost equal across the two sub-samples.  
 
Table 2 reports the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients for the total sample 
and the two sub-samples. Consistent with earlier studies for the US stock market we find a 
Pearson correlation coefficient of about -0.29 between cash-flows and accruals for the total 
sample. Following the argumentation of Kaserer and Klingler (2008) the significant negative 
correlation may partly be driven by the standardization of earnings by average total assets. 
However, this does not seem to have a big impact in our analysis as the correlation between 
deflated accruals and return on assets is only 0.165.
19 Hence, we can argue that this negative 
correlation is most probably due to firms that use accruals to smooth their earnings. 
 
- Insert table 2 about here – 
 
The second and third panel of table 2 report the correlation statistics for the two sub-
samples. Over all panel two and three show the same picture as the total sample. Again, both 
sub-samples report a highly significantly negative correlation between accruals and cash-
flows. Nevertheless there is one interesting difference. While the correlation between the 
accruals and the abnormal return shows only a slight negative value in the sample without 
managerial ownership, the Pearson correlation coefficient for the other sub-sample is -0.203. 
This implies that in the sub-sample with managerial ownership a more pronounced 
overvaluation of accruals can be expected. 
 
                                                 
18 The rate is measured by the ICB industry classification used in Thomson Financial Datastream. While the rate 
of high-tech firms between 2001 and 2003 for firm-year observations with no managerial ownership is about 
0.13 the corresponding rate for firm-year observations with stock owned by the management is about 0.41. 
19 Note that the negative correlation between cash-flows and accruals would be just a normalization effect if the 
correlation between deflated earnings and deflated accruals would equal 1.    13
4.2 Persistence of Earnings components 
 
The first step of our empirical analysis concerns the earnings persistence with respect 
to accruals and cash-flows. Following the approach introduced by Sloan (1996) we estimate 
the following linear forecasting equation:  
 
() ( ) 1 2 2 1 1 0 0 1 + + + ⋅ ⋅ + + ⋅ ⋅ + + ⋅ + = t t t t CF d ACC d d EAR ε β α β α β α                           (1)   
 
The dummy variable d is used to test whether persistence is related to managerial 
ownership. The first column of table 3 presents the regression results for the full sample. In 
accordance with the seminal study by Sloan (1996) as well as the study for the German capital 
market by Kaserer and Klingler (2008) we find a significantly higher persistence of future 
earnings with respect to cash-flows. However the absolute value of the regression parameter 
α1 for the accrual component with about 0.40
20 shows a substantial lower persistence
21 than 
the ones in the above mentioned studies. This finding is most probably due to the increased 
market pressure during the stock market hype.
22 As the persistence parameter of the cash-flow 
component with 0.716 is even slightly higher than the one reported in the study by Kaserer 
and Klingler (2008)
23 our results go along with international evidence that expects accruals to 
be the primary earnings management instrument. 
 
- Insert table 3 about here – 
 
Column two analyses the impact of managerial ownership on the persistence 
parameters. To isolate the influence of firms with managerial ownership we introduce a 
dummy variable d which is one if management is invested and zero otherwise (in the base 
case scenario). It turns out that persistency of the accrual and the cash-flow component is not 
significantly affected by managerial ownership. 
 
                                                 
20 The regression parameter for the accrual component in the paper by Sloan is 0.765; in the paper by Kaserer 
and Klingler (2008) it is 0.506. 
21 As our study includes the most actual data this implies that the overall persistence seems to decline. This is in 
line with the results reported by Kaserer and Klingler (2008), where they show that in the second time period of 
their paper (2000-2002) the persistence of earnings with respect to accruals is significantly lower than in the first 
time period of their study (1995-1999). 
22 Note that in not tabulated results the persistence parameter for the accrual component prior to the new market 
is about 0.48, while this value declines in the first years of the new market hype to 0.19. 
23 They report a regression parameter for the cash-flow component of 0.688.   14
4.3 Test of the accrual anomaly hypothesis 
 
In the previous section we have seen that the persistence of future earnings with 
respect to actual cash-flows and accruals differs. This holds true for firms with and without 
managerial ownership. Now we address the question whether investors at the capital market 
take this different persistence into account when valuing an investment. If this is the case 
security prices will be efficient and future abnormal returns will not be predictable based on 
past accruals or cash-flows.  
 
Following former studies we use two different approaches to test for this efficiency 
question. The first one is a linear pooled OLS regression approach, while the second one uses 
a regression equation system that consists of a forecasting equation and a rational pricing 
equation. We start with the OLS regression approach. If investors have rational expectations, 
i.e. they do not make any systematic errors in forecasting returns, future abnormal returns 
should not depend on past accounting figures. However, if investors overestimate 
(underestimate) the persistence of accruals (cash-flows), we expect that this mispricing will be 
resolved over time, and, hence, future abnormal returns will be negatively (positively) 
associated with past accruals (cash-flows). This hypothesis can be directly tested by the 
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As already mentioned above equation (2) contains four additional variables besides the cash-
flow and accrual component of future earnings to control for size, book-to-market and 
earnings-to-price effects. We further include year and industry dummies into our regression 
model.
24  The dummy variable d tests whether a possible market over- or under- reaction is 
due to managerial ownership. Capital market efficiency with respect to the information 
contained in accruals and cash-flows requires the condition αj = 0 in the base case to hold, and 
respectively  αj+β  j= 0 (j=1,2) in the case when the impact of managerial ownership is 
considered. 
                                                 
24 We include industry dummies which are based on the ICB industry classification used in Thomson Financial 
Datastream.   15
 
Column one of table 4A reports the results for the initial question whether the accrual 
anomaly is also present in the German capital market. Consistent with previous findings for 
the German stock market we find a significant overvaluation of the earnings persistence with 
respect to actual accruals. The cash component of earnings on the other hand is by trend 
undervalued but not at a level of statistical significance. As these findings hold after including 
the above described control variables as well as industry and time dummies we conclude that 
the accrual anomaly is a phenomenon which is also present in Germany. 
 
- Insert table 4A about here – 
 
Column two of table 4A addresses the hypothesis that managerial ownership 
influences the efficiency of the capital market with respect to the information contained in 
actual earnings components. Following the line of argumentation in section 2 we expect to 
find a misvaluation of actual accruals mainly in firms where management is invested and the 
null hypothesis H0 (i) should be rejected based on a joint test of α1+ β1 = 0. First of all, when 
analyzing the regression parameters α1 and α2 in column two it becomes obvious that in the 
base case scenario no misvaluation of accruals but an undervaluation of cash-flows occurs. 
When the firms with managerial ownership are considered (d=1) we find a significant 
overvaluation of the accrual component of earnings but no misvaluation of the cash 
component. This finding is reflected in the rejection of α1+β1 = 0 at a significance-level of 
99%, but no rejection of α2+β2 = 0. Therefore we conclude that the accrual anomaly is mainly 
driven by firms with managerial ownership and reject hypothesis H0 (i). 
  
The second test approach to analyse the above raised efficiency question starts with 
the efficient market model. In such a model of efficient capital markets abnormal security 
returns should depend positively on unexpected earnings changes: 
 
  ( ) [ ] 1 1 1 + + + + + − ⋅ = t q t q t t EAR E EAR ARE ν β                ( 3 )  
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Now, putting together the earnings forecasting model in equation (1), where the 
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The null hypothesis of capital market efficiency with respect to the information 
contained in accruals is tested by the nonlinear condition  1
*
1 α α =  by a Wald coefficient test
26. 
Consistent with results in the pooled OLS approach for the total sample column one of table 
4B reports a significant overestimation of the investors´ subjective earnings persistence with 
respect to the accrual component ( 657 . 0
*
1 = α ) compared to the objective persistence 
parameter ( 402 . 0 1 = α ). In contrast with the first test approach we find also a misvaluation of 
the cash component ( 457 . 0
*
2 = α , 716 . 0 2 = α ).  
 
- Insert table 4B about here – 
 
Column two reports the results for the isolated effect of managerial ownership. Again 
it becomes clear that a misevaluation with respect to actual accruals is most likely driven by 
firms with managerial ownership. This can be seen as  1
*
1 α α =  cannot be rejected in the base 




1 β α β α + = + on the other hand is refused at a 
level of significance of 99%.  
 
4.4 The influence of corporate governance mechanisms on the misvaluation of accruals  
 
The previous findings show that the accrual anomaly in the German capital market is 
mainly driven by firms with managerial ownership. This result might be influenced by 
managerial corporate policy choices: Management might exploit judgement latitudes to 
manage reported earnings in a system like the German one with weak enforcement of 
                                                 
25 Note that the rational pricing equation besides the accrual and cash-flow component again contains the above 
described control variables, year and industry dummies. To make the mechanism clear equation (4) presents only 
the basic construct. 
26 Cf. Greene (2000) for a description of the Wald coefficient test. We refrained from using the Mishkin test as 
an alternative test procedure due to its weaknesses described by Kraft (2007).    17
accounting rules and thus avoid passing private information to outside investors.
27 Based on 
this finding, we raise the question if differences in firm-level corporate governance are able to 
explain this market inefficiency. We test the impact of three distinct corporate governance 
mechanisms to reduce managerial discretion for the sub-sample with managerial ownership: 
conservative accounting, shareholder and creditor monitoring.
28 
 
The first mechanism under scrutiny is the accounting standard used by the sample 
firms to release the annual accounts. Following the findings by Kaserer and Klingler (2008) 
the anomaly should be more pronounced under a true-and-fair-view accounting system, which 
relies on difficult-to-verify information. Furthermore, such an accounting system leaves 
management more discretion in accounting policies compared to a conservative accounting 
system.
29 Hence, we presume that the accrual anomaly should be less pronounced under the 
conservative German GAAP as under the true-and-fair-view oriented IFRS. 
 
Table 5A reports the results for the corporate governance mechanisms received with 
the pooled OLS regression approach. Again, control variables, year and industry dummies are 
included to assure the findings are not biased by these effects.  
 
- Insert table 5A about here – 
 
The results with respect to the accounting standard are reported in column one. In the 
base case scenario parameter α1 indicates at a significance-level of 99% that security returns 
are not efficient with reference to actual accruals. However, if the regression is run in order to 
isolate the influence of firms reporting under German GAAP results are quite different. This 
becomes obvious as parameter ß1 is significantly positive, resulting in no rejection of 
α1+β1=0. This shows that for firms in the sub-sample with managerial ownership the anomaly 
does not occur if firms report under a conservative accounting standard. Therefore we reject 
the null hypothesis H0(ii). 
 
                                                 
27 Cf. e.g. Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005). 
28 As a robustness check, we have performed the same analysis for the entire sample. Our results indicate that the 
effects of those corporate governance mechanisms also hold true – sometimes at a different level of statistical 
significance – for the full sample. 
29 Cf. e.g. Guay and Verrecchia (2006).   18
We continue our analysis with another corporate governance device: the impact of 
creditor monitoring approximated by the leverage of the firm.
30 Column two presents the 
results of this second mechanism. Again in the base case scenario α1 with a value of about      
-0.703 is significantly different from zero indicating a misvaluation of actual accruals. When 
we are isolating the effect of firms with a high leverage a comparable picture to that in 
column one arises. The regression parameter ß1 is positive at a level of significance of 95% 
and the joint test of α1+β1=0 cannot be refused. Hence, we show that creditor monitoring is an 
efficient corporate governance mechanisms and we can reject hypothesis H0(iii).  
 
Finally, we analyse the impact of shareholder monitoring on the existence of the 
accrual anomaly. The results concerning the influence of an external blockholder are reported 
in column three. In contrast to both other regressions we find α1  not to be significantly 
different from zero. In this case that implies no mispricing can be assumed. Contrary to our 
expectation we find a misvaluation in the regression that isolates the influence of firms with 
an external block holder.
 31 This becomes clear as α1+β1=0 is different form zero at a level of 
significance of 99%. Hence, the null hypothesis H0(iv)  is rejected. However, instead of 
reducing the existence of the accrual anomaly, the presence of a blockholder even reinforces 
the capital market inefficiency. One potential explanation is that management and outside 
blockholders work together in such cases to expropriate minority investors by extracting 
private benefits of control. One might ask whether the mode of action of the three corporate 
governance mechanisms does hold if they are analysed simultaneously within one linear 
regression model. Hence, as a further robustness check we perform such a regression 
including all three corporate governance mechanisms simultaneously. Please note, that 
                                                 
30 Note that the precise variable of interest to measure the impact of bank monitoring would be bank debt. 
However, the Worldscope database does not report this variable. Hence, we take total debt as a proxy. To assure 
this assumption is reasonable we calculated for a sub-sample of Prime Standard firms in 2003 (which is the first 
year of the Prime Standard as the transparency standard with the highest disclosure requirements in Germany) 
the correlation between hand collected bank debt from annual reports and total debt as reported by the 
Worldscope Database. As this correlation is considerably high with about  0.77, we believe total debt to be rather 
useful approximation for creditor monitoring by banks. In our analysis we have transformed the continuous 
variable of total leverage into a binary variable which is one for firms with a high leverage and zero for firms 
with a low leverage. We have used the median value of total debt to generate this dummy variable. We believe 
that this procedure makes sense since otherwise we would assume a linear relationship between leverage and 
monitoring effects. However, we interpret Jensen’s (1986) free cash-flow hypothesis in a way that it neither 
assumes this linearity nor is the monitoring effect of debt related to a certain level of leverage. However, our 
results remain qualitatively unchanged if we substitute the dummy variable with the continuous variable total 
debt in our analysis. 
31 This result is robust against an alternative test with outside blockholders having a larger voting power. In 
particular, we have used ownership levels of 10% and 25% to perform such a robustness test with unchanged 
results.   19
although not tabulated here the effects of the three corporate governance mechanisms remain 
unchanged if we apply such a simultaneous test procedure. 
 
 
- Insert table 5B about here – 
 
  Table 5B reports the results for the second test approach. Column one of table 5B 
corresponds to the findings of column one in table 5A. Again the second test approach 
confirms the results of the pooled OLS regression. In the base case scenario  767 . 0
*
1 = α is 
significantly higher than  377 . 0 1 = α  showing the subjective overestimation of earnings 
persistence with respect to actual accruals. Isolating the effect stemming from firms reporting 
under German GAAP we find no significant misvaluation.  
 
  Column two concerns the impact of creditor monitoring. In accordance with the 
findings in table 5A we find a significant mispricing only in the base case. Finally, we test the 
effects of shareholder monitoring. Again, the result of the Wald coefficient test for 
shareholder monitoring is consistent with the result of the pooled OLS regression. 
Shareholder monitoring seems not to be an efficient corporate governance mechanism.  
    
 
4.5 Evaluating the economic relevance of findings 
 
  Section 4.3 showed that in a statistical sense accruals are not properly reflected in 
security prices at the German capital market and that this inefficiency is mainly driven by 
firms with managerial ownership. In this section we address the question if this inefficiency is 
not only from a statistical point of view but also from an economic point of view meaningful. 
Therefore we conduct a hedge portfolio test comparable to that in the seminal paper by Sloan 
(1996).
32 We have to mention that a significant hedge return is not a sure indication of market 
inefficiency, as the hedge portfolio test does neither include control variables, nor does it 
                                                 
32 Note that in contrast to the hedge portfolio test used in the study by Sloan (1996), we do not use deciles 
portfolios but calculate the hedge returns by taking a long position in the stock of firms in the lowest 30% 
percentile of accruals and taking a short position in the stock of firms in the highest 30% percentile of accruals. 
We have to perform the hedge portfolio test in this way, since our sub-sample with managerial ownership has too 
little observations for a procedure based on deciles. However, it should be mentioned that our procedure is more 
conservative and hedge returns are expected to be even higher when taking the long and short positions only in 
the extreme deciles.   20
consider arbitrage limits like short selling constraints or transaction costs. However we expect 
that a significant hedge return should occur most likely in the sample with managerial 
ownership. Due to too little observations in the years 1995 to 1997 the hedge returns are only 
calculated for the period from 1998 to 2005. 
 
- Insert figure 1 about here – 
 
  Panel (A) plots the yearly hedge portfolio returns for the full sample. In accordance 
with the finding in section 4.3 that the accrual component is not properly reflected in security 
prices, the mean yearly hedge return is about 0.148 showing a maximum of 0.476 in the year 
2002 and a minimum of 0.046 in the year 2003. Hence, there is not a single year in which the 
hedge return is negative.  
 
Panel (B) shows the results for the sample without managerial ownership. In contrast 
to the results for the full sample two of eight yearly hedge returns are negative and two more 
are quite close to zero. This results in a mean hedge portfolio return for the period 1998 to 
2005 of 0.083 with a standard deviation of 0.146. Hence for the sub-sample without 
managerial ownership we find no statistically significant positive hedge return. 
 
The last panel documents the findings for the sub-sample with managerial ownership. 
As expected from the results of section 4.3 the mean hedge return for this sub-sample is the 
highest with a value of 0.237. Again like in the total sample no observation shows a negative 
value. The minimum yearly hedge return is 0.070 in year 2003, the maximum 0.569 in year 
2002. Including the standard deviation of 0.158 the mean yearly hedge return of this sub-
sample is positive at a level of significance of 99%. 
 
Overall, the hedge portfolio test corroborates earlier findings for the U.S. (e.g. by 
Sloan 1996) that an investment strategy based on the accrual anomaly leads to significant 
abnormal stock market returns (for the full sample). However, this is the first study to confirm 
the success of such an investment strategy for Germany. Moreover, we show that managerial 
ownership is an important determinant for the existence of the accrual anomaly not only from 
a statistical but also from an economic point of view. In fact, it has a strong impact on the 
success of such an investment strategy. A comparison of the two sub-samples for firms with 
and without managerial ownership indicates significant differences in realised returns. As   21
supposed, abnormal returns are much higher for the sub-sample of firms with managerial 
ownership. However, as already noted above the implementation of such a strategy in the real 
world might be hindered by market imperfections, such as transaction costs.  
  
5. Summary and Conclusion 
 
  This paper aims to analyse how the accrual anomaly is related to firm-level differences 
in corporate ownership and governance mechanisms. In particular, we focus on the impact of 
managerial ownership and selected corporate governance mechanisms. In accordance with 
previous studies for the US capital market as well as for the German capital market we find 
earnings to be less persistent with respect to prior year’s accruals than with respect to prior 
year’s cash-flows for German firms. Also in line with previous findings we document an 
overvaluation of accruals in Germany. Based on the panel structure of our data which allows 
us to cover different firms over a longer period of time, we can show that the accrual anomaly 
for Germany documented by Kaserer and Klingler (2008) seems to be quite robust.  
 
Our second finding indicates that the accrual anomaly is mainly driven by firms with 
managerial ownership. However, we do not find evidence for a significant accrual mispricing 
in the sub-sample without managerial ownership complying with international accounting 
rules. This corroborates the results presented by Gabrielsen et al. (2002), who showed that in 
a continental European setting earnings quality declines with the level of managerial 
ownership. Moreover, we find the degree of accrual mispricing to be inversely related to the 
degree of creditor management. However, shareholder monitoring seems to be no effective 
monitoring mechanism in the context of less developed markets for corporate control, such as 
Germany. 
 
Overall, our results complement existing research about factors influencing the accrual 
anomaly. We show that besides the institutional setting (LaFond (2005), Pincus et al. (2007)) 
and the accounting system (Kaserer and Klingler (2008)), firm-level ownership and corporate 
governance characteristics have also a strong impact on the existence of the accrual anomaly. 
However, there are some limitations to these findings: First, earnings quality can be measured 
in several ways. In our study we focus on capital market reactions by analysing the accrual 
anomaly. However, an alternative approach would be to test the impact of managerial 
ownership on earnings manipulation and accounting policies. Second, our study intentionally   22
is based on one single country – Germany – in order to hold the institutional setting constant. 
In this sense, it is important to see whether our results hold true for other countries and more 
importantly for other institutional settings (e.g. common law countries like the U.S. and the 
U.K.). Another natural avenue for future research is to test the impact of other corporate 
governance devices on the existence of the accrual anomaly, e.g. monitoring by the board of 
directors, analyst coverage or executive compensation. 
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N  3109 1839 1270
EARt+1 -0.005129 0.015249 -0.034637
0.023988 0.026819 0.017035
(0.140638) (0.105693) (0.175468)
ACCt -0.062578 -0.056936 -0.070748
-0.053111 -0.053135 -0.053007
(0.118024) (0.097047) (0.142696)
CFt 0.053267 0.06696 0.033441
0.064998 0.072727 0.048843
(0.115176) (0.094036) (0.137901)
AREt+1  0.046222 0.04272 0.051293
-0.034959 -0.017226 -0.065381
(0.533331) (0.482405) (0.59962)
weighted mean 0.03279 0.0348 0.01200
MVt 5.143304 5.424959 4.735457
5.034388 5.33967 4.665909
(0.891012) (0.916345) (0.668415)
BTMt 0.81541 0.775649 0.872985
0.589442 0.56528 0.639759
(0.910592) (0.907607) (0.912185)
ETPt -0.137017 -0.069461 -0.23484
0.034048 0.042269 0.01725
(0.640257) (0.502929) (0.788317)
BETAt 0.531127 0.465641 0.625952
0.435328 0.359471 0.539471
(0.564422) (0.52306) (0.607254)
weighted mean 0.83431 0.79446 1.19827
MOt 0.148417 0 0.36333
0 -- 0.3557
(0.23656) -- (0.242716)
LEVt 0.198659 0.197738 0.199994
0.170556 0.174529 0.158935
(0.177073) (0.169317) (0.187797)
5% Blockholdert 0.696687 0.814573 0.525984
National 0.471213 0.573681 0.322835
International 0.528787 0.426319 0.677165
The variables are defined as follows: EAR=Earnings before extraordinary items deflated by total average assets; ACC=Earnings before extraordinary 
items minus cash flow from operating activities deflated by average total assets; CF=Cash flow from operating activities deflated by average total assets; 
ARE=Abnormal return measured as the annual buy-and-hold stock return minus the annual return of the CDAX Index for Germany starting four months 
after the fiscal year end; MV=Logarithm of the market value four months after the fiscal year end; BTM=Book-to-market ratio four months after the 
fiscal year end; ETP=Earnings-to-price ratio four months after the fiscal year end; BETA=52 weeks beta calculated with respect to the CDAX Index 
over a period ending at fiscal year end. MO=Stock owned by the management of the firm. LEV=Total Debt deflated by total average assets. 5% 
Blockholder is a dummy variable which equals 1 if there is an outside blockholder. National standards include firms complying with HGB, HGB with 
EEC and IASC guidelines, HGB with some EEC guidelines. International standards include firms complying with IFRS/IAS, US GAAP, US GAAP 
reclassified from local standards.
Table 1
Mean, Median and Standard Deviation of Selected Variables
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Sample: ALL  N (firm-years): 3.109
EAR t+1 ACC t CF t ARE t MV t BTM t ETP t BETA t
EAR t+1 1 0.101** 0.463** 0.242** 0.366** -0.359** 0.457** -0.088**
ACC t 0.165** 1 -0.46** -0.111** 0.146** -0.078** 0.335** -0.03
CF t 0.488** -0.294** 1 0.096** 0.324** -0.187** 0.418** -0.081**
ARE t 0.173** -0.141** 0.036* 1 0.01 0.115** 0.06** -0.029
MV t 0.326** 0.172** 0.305** -0.066** 1 -0.393** 0.389** 0.104**
BTM t -0.265** -0.103** -0.134** 0.136** -0.337** 1 -0.06** 0.011
ETP t 0.36** 0.503** 0.285** -0.109** 0.343** -0.308** 1 -0.135**
BETA t -0.181** -0.071** -0.114** 0.014 0.116** 0.062** -0.141** 1
Sample: LOW Managerial Ownership N (firm-years): 1.839
EAR ACC CFL ARE MV BTMV ETP BETA
EAR t+1 1 0.07** 0.463** 0.26** 0.3** -0.305** 0.402** -0.027
ACC t 0.17** 1 -0.526** -0.043 0.096** -0.018 0.306** -0.032
CF t 0.477** -0.346** 1 0.103** 0.261** -0.158** 0.363** -0.002
ARE t 0.197** -0.062** 0.048* 1 0.069** 0.088** 0.105** -0.048*
MV t 0.295** 0.129** 0.27** -0.014 1 -0.314** 0.27** 0.265**
BTM t -0.176** -0.012 -0.099** 0.082** -0.312** 1 0.079** -0.011
ETP t 0.33** 0.429** 0.263** -0.049* 0.328** -0.145** 1 -0.021
BETA t -0.098** -0.062** -0.054* 0 0.239** -0.036 -0.07** 1
Sample: HIGH Managerial Ownership N (firm-years): 1.270
EAR ACC CFL ARE MV BTMV ETP BETA
EAR t+1 1 0.132** 0.46** 0.219** 0.402** -0.415** 0.509** -0.141**
ACC t 0.151** 1 -0.392** -0.193** 0.228** -0.152** 0.393** -0.02
CF t 0.475** -0.278** 1 0.076** 0.333** -0.206** 0.462** -0.144**
ARE t 0.165** -0.203** 0.029 1 -0.137** 0.16** -0.034 0.005
MV t 0.328** 0.232** 0.318** -0.161** 1 -0.502** 0.455** 0.048
BTM t -0.349** -0.19** -0.16** 0.2** -0.419** 1 -0.238** 0.033
ETP t 0.355** 0.545** 0.277** -0.154** 0.364** -0.466** 1 -0.229**
BETA t -0.212** -0.066* -0.132** 0.026 0.105** 0.169** -0.172** 1
This Table gives the Pearson (lower diagonal) and Spearman (upper diagonal) correlation coefficients. The variables are defined as follows: 
EAR=Earnings before extraordinary items deflated by total average assets; ACC=Earnings before extraordinary items minus cash flow 
from operating activities deflated by average total assets; CF=Cash flow from operating activities deflated by average total assets; 
ARE=Abnormal return measured as the annual buy-and-hold stock return minus the annual return of the CDAX Index for Germany starting 
four months after the fiscal year end; MV=Logarithm of the market value four months after the fiscal year end; BTM=Book-to-market ratio 
four months after the fiscal year end; ETP=Earnings-to-price ratio four months after the fiscal year end; BETA=52 weeks beta calculated 
with respect to the CDAX Index over a period ending at fiscal year end. ** indicates significance at the 0.01 level (two-tailed), * indicates 
significance at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
Table 2
Correlation Statistics









N (firm-years) 3109 3109













adj. R² 0.341356 0.3464
α 1 = α 2 rejection*** rejection***
α 1+β1 = α 2+β 2 rejection***
The variables are defined as follows: EAR=Earnings before extraordinary items deflated by total average assets; ACC=Earnings 
before extraordinary items minus cash flow from operating activities deflated by average total assets; CF=Cash flow from operating 
activities deflated by average total assets; d=Dummy variable equal 0 in the base case szenario and otherwise equal 1 (in eq. (2) if 
firm-year belongs to group "Managerial Ownership").  *** indicates significance at the 0.01 level (two-tailed), ** indicates significance 
at the 0.05 level, * indicates significance at the 0.1 level (two-tailed). a1=a2 is tested by comparing the confidence intervals of the 
coefficients; a1+b1=a2+b2 is tested by a Wald test statistic (cf. Greene (2000), p. 153 n.).
Table 3
Pooled OLS Regression of One-year Ahead Earnings on Current Accruals and Cash Flows
(White adjusted Standard Errors in Parentheses)
EAR t+1 = α 0 + β 0·d  + (α 1 + β 1·d) ·  ACC t + (α 2 + β 2·d)  · CF t +  ε t+1









N (firm-years) 3109 3109




















Year Dummies included included
Industry Dummies included included
R² 0.100885 0.103936
adj. R² 0.094181 0.096376
α 1+β1=0 rejection***
α 2+β2=0 no rejection
The variables are defined as follows: EAR=Earnings before extraordinary items deflated by total average assets; ACC=Earnings 
before extraordinary items minus cash flow from operating activities deflated by average total assets; CF=Cash flow from 
operating activities deflated by average total assets; ARE=Abnormal return measured as the annual buy-and-hold stock return 
minus the annual return of the CDAX starting four months after the fiscal year end; MV=Logarithm of the market value four months 
after the fiscal year end; BTM=Book-to-market ratio four months after the fiscal year end; ETP=Earnings-to-price ratio four months 
after the fiscal year end; BETA=52 weeks beta calculated with respect to the CDAX Index over a period ending at fiscal year end. 
d=Dummy variable equal 0 in the base case szenario (in eq. (2) if  management is not invested in the firm) and otherwise equal 1.  
***, **, * Significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level, resp., using a two-tailed t-test. a1+b1= 0 and a2+b2 = 0  is tested by a Wald 
test statistic (cf. Greene (2000), p. 153 n.).
Table 4A
Pooled OLS Regression of Abnormal Returns on Earnings Components and Control 
Variables
(White adjusted Standard Errors in Parentheses)
ARE t+1 = α 0 + β 0·d  + (α 1 + β 1·d) ·  ACC t + (α 2 + β 2·d)  · CF t +  
β 3  · MV t + β 4  · BTM t + β 5  · ETP t + β 6  · BETA t + ε t+1









N (firm-years) 3109 3109

















* < 0.001 < 0.304
α 1+ß 1=α 1
*+ß 1
* < 0.001
Significance Level (Wald Test)
The variables are defined as follows: EAR=Earnings before extraordinary items deflated by total average assets; 
ACC=Earnings before extraordinary items minus cash flow from operating activities deflated by average total assets; 
CFL=Cash flow from operating activities deflated by average total assets; ARE=Abnormal return measured as the annual buy-
and-hold stock return minus the annual return of the CDAX starting four months after the fiscal year end; The included control 
variables in the rational pricing equation cover: MV=Logarithm of the market value four months after the fiscal year end; 
BTM=Book-to-market ratio four months after the fiscal year end; ETP=Earnings-to-price ratio four months after the fiscal year 
end; BETA=52 weeks beta calculated with respect to the CDAX Index over a period ending at fiscal year end; The rational 
pricing equation contains also industry and year dummies; d=Dummy variable equal 0 in the base case szenario (in eq. (2) if  
management is not invested in the firm) and otherwise equal 1. a1=a2 and a1+b1are tested by a Wald test statistic (cf. Greene 
(2000), p. 153 n.).
Table 4B
Estimation for the System of Forecasting Equation and Rational Pricing Equation
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N (firm-years) 1270 1270 1270
α 0 -0.111673 -0.038275 -0.04253
(0.210367) (0.198376) (0.201101)
β0 0.049692 -0.005876 -0.027919
(0.051902) (0.034704) (0.035048)
α 1 -0.62575*** -0.702784*** -0.316435
(0.221911) (0.240185) (0.24644)
β1 0.709457* 0.601784** -0.356695
(0.386862) (0.29624) (0.289341)
α 2 0.020197 0.028475 0.264105
(0.192524) (0.203117) (0.227554)
β2 0.600841* 0.453814 -0.224379
(0.32902) (0.280921) (0.271778)
β3 -0.048058 -0.048357 -0.044941
(0.032891) (0.032588) (0.032718)
β4 0.074426*** 0.064612** 0.073461***
(0.028136) (0.027919) (0.028216)
β5 0.018784 0.004893 0.020017
(0.033162) (0.035404) (0.032702)
β6 0.026113 -0.005876 0.018593
(0.033455) (0.032199) (0.032081)
Year Dummies included included included
Industry Dummies included included included
R² 0.129036 0.129915 0.126149
adj. R² 0.110818 0.111716 0.10787
α 1+β1=0 no rejection no rejection rejection***
α 2+β2=0 rejection* rejection* no rejection
The variables are defined as follows: EAR=Earnings before extraordinary items deflated by total average assets; ACC=Earnings 
before extraordinary items minus cash flow from operating activities deflated by average total assets; CF=Cash flow from 
operating activities deflated by average total assets; ARE=Abnormal return measured as the annual buy-and-hold stock return 
minus the annual return of the CDAX starting four months after the fiscal year end; MV=Logarithm of the market value four 
months after the fiscal year end; BTM=Book-to-market ratio four months after the fiscal year end; ETP=Earnings-to-price ratio 
four months after the fiscal year end; BETA=52 weeks beta calculated with respect to the CDAX Index over a period ending at 
fiscal year end; Blockholder is defined as an outside investor who holds more than 5% of the outstanding shares. d=Dummy 
variable equal 0 in the base case szenario (in eq. (2) if the accounting standard is international) and otherwise equal 1.  ***, **, * 
Significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level, resp., using a two-tailed t-test. a1+b1= 0 and a2+b2 = 0  is tested by a Wald test statis
Table 5A
Pooled OLS Regression of Abnormal Returns on Earnings Components and Control 
Variables
(White adjusted Standard Errors in Parentheses)
ARE t+1 = α 0 + β 0·d  + (α 1 + β 1·d) ·  ACC t + (α 2 + β 2·d)  · CF t +  
β 3  · MV t + β 4  · BTM t + β 5  · ETP t + β 6  · BETA t + ε t+1













N (firm-years) 1270 1270 1270
α 1 0.376508 0.369407 0.352939
(0.032013) (0.037035) (0.045303)
β1 0.010331 0.01276 0.037766
(0.078312) (0.056231) (0.056577)
α 2 0.696735 0.748137 0.680768
(0.035375) (0.037224) (0.04638)
β2 0.064715 -0.107381 0.054975
(0.075108) (0.066128) (0.062438)
α 1* 0.767402 0.824923 0.514651
(0.125344) (0.132981) (0.159647)
β1* -0.474552 -0.42227 0.29125
(0.223896) (0.162104) (0.157429)
α 2* 0.575173 0.61168 0.337982
(0.118782) (0.120457) (0.154142)
β2* -0.424573 -0.43566 0.269493
(0.219653) (0.189182) (0.173645)
α 1=α 1
* < 0.003 < 0.002 < 0.330
α 1+ß 1=α 1
*+ß 1
*
Significance Level (Wald Test) < 0.699 < 0.905 < 0.003
The variables are defined as follows: EAR=Earnings before extraordinary items deflated by total average assets; ACC=Earnings 
before extraordinary items minus cash flow from operating activities deflated by average total assets; CF=Cash flow from operating 
activities deflated by average total assets; ARE=Abnormal return measured as the annual buy-and-hold stock return minus the annual 
return of the CDAX starting four months after the fiscal year end; The included control variables in the rational pricing equation cover: 
MV=Logarithm of the market value four months after the fiscal year end; BTM=Book-to-market ratio four months after the fiscal year 
end; ETP=Earnings-to-price ratio four months after the fiscal year end; BETA=52 weeks calculated over a period ending at fiscal year 
end; The rational pricing equation contains also industry and year dummies; d=Dummy variable equal 0 in the base case szenario (in 
eq. (2) if  the firm reports its yearly account under international standards) and otherwise equal 1. a1=a2 and a1+b1= 0 are tested by a 
Wald test statistic (cf. Greene (2000), p. 153 n.).
Table 5B
Estimation for the System of Forecasting Equation and Rational Pricing Equation
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(A) Total Sample
(B) No Managerial Ownership
(C) Managerial Ownership
Returns by calendar year to a hedge portfolio taking a long position in the stock of firms in the lowest 30% percentile of accruals and taking a short 
position in the stock of firms in the highest 30% percentile of accruals. Returns are cumulated over a one-year period beginning four months after 
fiscal year end. Accruals are defined as Earnings before extraordinary items minus cash flow from operating activities deflated by average total 
assets. The years 1995 to 1997 are droped due to too little observations. All portfolios included consist at least of 15 stocks.
Figure 1
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